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Abstract 
Given the high level of uncertainty in commodity markets, this paper argues the need for 
transparency-boosting measures specifically tailored to commodity and commodity derivatives 
markets. In particular, encouraging the creation of a clearing infrastructure for OTC commodity and 
commodity derivatives markets would be desirable. Moreover, EU regulators should consider 
setting up a new, more effective market abuse regime aimed at preventing manipulation in both the 
physical and financial commodities markets. Finally, in cooperation with the G20, EU authorities 
should consider the creation of an International Commodity Agency to increase transparency and 
restore confidence in international physical markets for commodities.   
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1. Introduction 
Although commodity derivatives are lumped together with other alternative investments and 
seen as a new asset class to conveniently provide portfolio diversification, they are not classic 
financial instruments as such. Firstly, unlike interest rates, inflation rates, stocks, bonds or other 
financial or meteorological variables, commodity derivatives’ underlying assets are physical 
commodities with finite supply and sizeable storage and transportation costs. Secondly, 
commodity and commodity derivatives markets are only partly transparent, and the paucity and 
unreliability of the data do not provide a foundation for sufficient market integrity. This brings 
us to a third difference with equity and fixed-income markets: commodity derivatives afford a 
fundamental price discovery function, coalescing in futures prices information about present and 
expected supply, demand and inventory, all of which directly affect spot commodity prices. 
Because of the social utility and informational role attached to futures markets, it is imperative 
to explore the implications of the financialisation of commodity derivatives, whereby more and 
more institutional investors have entered the market treating commodities as an alternative asset 
class. 
Against this background, this paper argues that transparency-boosting measures specifically 
tailored to commodity and commodity derivatives markets are much needed. In particular, 
encouraging the creation of a clearing infrastructure for OTC commodity and commodity 
derivatives markets would be desirable. Moreover, EU regulators should consider setting up a 
new, more effective market abuse regime aimed at preventing manipulation in both the physical 
and financial commodities markets. Finally, in cooperation with the G20, EU authorities should 
consider the creation of an International Commodity Agency to increase transparency and 
restore confidence in international physical markets for commodities.    
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses the fundamentals of commodity 
spot and futures markets. Section 3 presents both physical commodity markets and commodity 
derivative markets in their usual breakdown categories: agriculture, metals and energy. Section 
4 discusses the regulations in the EU and the US concerning commodity derivatives. Section 5 
advances certain policy proposals and the last section draws the conclusions.   
2.  Fundamentals of Commodity Spot and Futures Markets 
A commodity is defined as “an intermediate good with a standard quality, which can be traded 
on competitive and liquid global international physical markets” (Clark et al., 2001, p. 3). Some 
authors include carbon emissions, interest rates or other economic variables in the definition of 
commodities. However, for the purposes of this paper, only physical commodities with supply 
constraints, transportation costs and storage costs are considered.
1  
This section starts by giving an historical overview of commodity markets. It then discusses the 
characteristics of spot commodity markets: responsibility for execution of contracts, market 
actors, freight and shipping costs, theory of storage, price volatility and transparency. Finally, it 
explores the fundamentals of futures markets: the price discovery function, the spot-future price 
relationship with the convenience yield and market actors.  
2.1  Brief history of commodity markets 
Commodity spot markets originated from trading in agricultural products. They have developed 
from local, medieval fairs into regional – sometimes global – liquid markets. The gradual 
organisation of supply and demand through commodity exchanges has brought several 
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advantages to producers, consumers, and to the world economy in general. First, the prices 
available on commodity exchanges provided information on fundamental market conditions, 
informing future decisions about production and consumption. Moreover, prices quoted on 
commodity exchanges supplanted prices set by monopolistic producers, which contributed to an 
increase in the competitiveness of commodity markets. Second, commodity exchanges lowered 
transaction costs by reducing intermediaries and facilitating the matching of buyers and 
suppliers. Third, they provided storage facilities and clearing services, thereby further increasing 
the liquidity and efficiency of commodity cash markets.  
In spite of these advantages, international market integration has allowed producers to increase 
their market power. The more commodity markets become integrated, the more opportunities 
for consolidation and market concentration in the industry arise. For example, a handful of 
players control the world’s aluminium market from extraction to semi-finished products. Soft 
commodities markets such as cocoa and coffee also experience a high level of concentration.    
Price volatility has been an inherent characteristic of commodities for centuries because supply, 
demand and inventories – the main determinants of spot prices – can be affected by such diverse 
factors as floods, droughts, war, technology, fluctuations in economic activity and the disruption 
of distribution or production. Moreover, the seasonality of agricultural products has exacerbated 
this problem, and only with the advent of storage facilities has the issue been somewhat 
mitigated. In spite of their long-term decline, real commodity prices have witnessed ample 
short- and medium-term fluctuations throughout history. In particular, volatility has been rising 
since the early 1970s driven by the demise of fixed parities and increasingly volatile exchange 
rates (Cashin & McDermott, 2001). Because commodities are generally priced in dollars, 
massive swings in real and nominal dollar exchange rates vis-à-vis other currencies affect 
commodity prices both directly and indirectly. Directly means that prices move mechanically in 
light of exchange rate movements; indirectly means that these mechanical changes affect the 
supply and demand of the commodity (ibid, p. 23). 
Risk management tools have emerged to battle against commodity price volatility. Although 
certain primitive forms of forward markets existed in the pre-Christian and Middle Ages, the 
modern practice of forward contracting slowly emerged in Japan in the 1700s and in the United 
States in the mid-1800s. Forwards are defined as contracts between two parties to deliver a 
certain product at a certain date at an agreed price. By selling crops at the time of planting, 
producers hedged against the risk that the price of the commodity would drop below a threshold 
under which production became unprofitable. Forward contracts, however, generated new risks 
for the parties involved in the forms of transportation risk, delivery risk and credit risk. The 
first category pertains to the deterioration of goods during transportation, unforeseen changes in 
shipping costs and extraordinary events such as wars, riots or strikes that may prevent the 
transportation from happening at all. Delivery risk refers to the concern that the quality and the 
quantity of the good delivered does not correspond to the agreed contract. Credit risk regards the 
payment of the good delivered.  
The need to counter the risks associated with forwards and the lack of transparency in forwards 
markets led to the establishment of highly standardised contracts becoming freely exchangeable 
on the marketplace – futures contracts. Futures are similar to forwards, but they are standardised 
contracts in terms of quality, quantity, date and place of delivery, all of which reduce 
transportation and delivery risks. Moreover, they are cleared by a clearing-house, drastically 
reducing the scope of credit risk. From the 1970s on, the increased liquidity driven by the 
evolution of commodity derivatives has provided a wide variety of risk management tools to 
producers and consumers of commodities in the form of options, futures and over-the-counter THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY IN COMMODITY AND COMMODITY DERIVATIVES MARKETS | 3 
 
(OTC) contracts.
2 Finally, the high level of transparency in futures prices provides information 
about market conditions and expectations of supply and demand.  
2.2  Characteristics of commodity spot markets 
Transactions following the stipulation of commodity contracts take place generally with a lag 
because the goods must be physically delivered. The contract specifies the exact terms of the 
execution and delivery. At one end of the spectrum, we find Free on Board (FOB) contracts 
whereby the buyer pays for shipping and freight insurance; at the other end of the spectrum, we 
find Carriage, Insurance and Freight (CIF) contracts whereby the seller pays for these costs until 
the goods arrive at a determined location.
3 Many other types of contract specifications exist, but 
the explanation of these goes beyond the scope of this paper.
4 In some instances, intermediaries 
can play a role in the process with a resulting fragmentation of commercial responsibility.  
The  actors in commodity markets are very diverse, and players vary according to the 
commodities being traded. In general, producers (e.g. farmers, oil producers, refiners, electric 
utilities, mining companies and others) and consumers (e.g. food industry, wholesalers, airline 
industry, transportation networks operators, shipbuilding industry and others) of commodities 
are the main actors of commodity spot markets. In some commodities, however, especially 
agricultural and metals, traders may play an important role in connecting producers and 
consumers, sometimes accumulating stocks to clear the market at all times. Moreover, in the last 
decade financial players such as hedge funds and banks – previously active solely in commodity 
derivatives – have gradually entered the physical market to gain inside knowledge into the 
underlying assets. For instance, Goldman Sachs owns a stake in an oil refinery and a natural gas 
pipeline in the US. JP Morgan is also involved in the business through the hedge fund 
Highbridge Capital, which acquired a stake in the Louis Dreyfus Group – a historical French 
commodity trader (Financial Times, 2008a; New York Times, 2007). Finally, other actors are 
stockists, commodity brokers, warehouse operators, commodity carriers, insurance companies 
and insurance brokers. These actors do not usually engage in physical trading.   
Freight costs are an important part of commodity spot pricing. The freight spot market is 
opaque and bilateral. The Baltic Exchange in London collects data from international 
shipbrokers to form several reference prices among which the Baltic Dry Index (BDI) is the 
most commonly used benchmark. The BDI is a daily index composed of 22 reference prices of 
key dry bulk routes.
5 In order to provide hedging tools, in 1985 the Baltic Exchange launched 
the Baltic International Freight Future Exchange (BIFFEX), but the lack of liquidity of the 
contracts convinced the operator to cease trading in 2001. Because the BIFFEX’s settlement 
price was based on an index composed of substantially different routes, market agents were left 
with substantial risk even after hedging (Geman, 2005, p. 18). Today the most common 
derivative contracts are Forward Freight Agreements (FFA) specifically tailored to certain 
                                                      
2 OTC contracts are direct bilateral financial contracts. This category encompasses forwards, swaps and 
other complex products such as ‘swaptions’, swing contracts, caps, floors and spread options. Some OTC 
contracts are cleared through an exchange, and have similar characteristics to exchange-traded futures – a 
condition that blurs the distinction between futures and OTC contracts.  
3 It is up to the buyer, however, to pay for transportation and freight insurance from the specified location 
to its own storage facility.  
4 For a detailed explanation of all types of contract, see the website of the International Chamber of 
Commerce, http://www.iccwbo.org/incoterms/id3040/index.html 
5 http://www.balticexchange.com, accessed 8 September, 2008. The website lists six reasons for freight 
costs fluctuation (1)fleet supply (2)commodities demand (3)seasonal pressure (4)fuel prices (5) 
infrastructure bottle-necks (6) market sentiment. 4 | PIERO CINQUEGRANA 
 
routes. However, the International Maritime Exchange (Imarex) in Oslo still offers BDI-based 
futures contracts as well as clearing services for FFA.   
Commodity stocks are a fundamental drive in determining prices together with supply and 
demand. The theory of storage was developed in the 1930s and 1940s and aims at explaining 
why economic agents hold inventories. Stocks are beneficial mainly to meet unexpected 
demand, to avoid frequent changes in produced quantities, and to minimise disturbances arising 
from production and distribution disruptions (Geman, 2005, p. 24). In order to understand the 
importance of stocks in determining prices, we shall take the example of the sole non-storable 
commodity: electricity. The electricity market witnesses spikes in spot prices in an order of 
magnitude of 20 or 30 times the ‘normal’ level. Because of the price inelasticity of demand, 
prices must rise considerably to secure equilibrium in the electricity cash market in case of 
supply shortage. Hence, without the buffer provided by inventory, electricity prices tend to vary 
widely. Deaton and Laroque (1992) find a strong inverse correlation between price volatility 
and world inventory across 13 different commodities. Put differently, high stocks reduce price 
volatility. All these elements demonstrate the importance of inventories in determining both 
prices and price volatility of commodities. 
In light of the sheer number of variables involved, commodity price volatility is a complex issue 
to address. Weather events, seasonality and deterioration of agricultural products, storage and 
transportation costs, inventories, and fluctuations in economic activity are some of the 
intervening factors already mentioned. However, the list is not exhaustive. Three more issues 
are worth discussing: reserves, interrelation of prices, and transparency. The arrival of news 
regarding proven reserves may be a further shock affecting both the prices and the volatility of 
commodities, particularly in the case of gas and oil. Because of the exhaustible nature of fossil 
fuels, the inter-temporal decision to extract today rather than tomorrow depends both on price 
expectation and proved reserves (see Gros, 2008). Moreover, because the price of oil directly 
impacts freight and electricity costs (fuel prices), commodity prices show a high correlation. 
Specifically, the price of oil is the trend-setter in commodity markets. Finally, the lack of 
transparency in commodity markets affects price volatility, which is amplified by the fast 
transmission of news through futures markets. Although some markets are more transparent 
than others, in general complete and reliable information about demand, supply and inventory is 
hard to come by. This creates uncertainty, and market confidence in pricing mechanisms is 
generally low, especially in the electricity and gas markets. 
2.3  Characteristics of commodity futures markets 
The primary functions of futures markets are hedging and price discovery. As discussed above, 
forwards markets originated because producers needed to hedge against high volatility in the 
price of agricultural products. The literature also calls this function risk transfer because the risk 
is transferred from commercial players to those speculators who are willing to assume it. 
Forwards evolved into futures markets in order to limit the risks associated with forward 
contracting. As liquidity increased thanks to the transparency of futures exchanges and the 
standardisation of their contracts, the high number of participants has facilitated the 
transmission of information about commodities to the marketplace.  
To see why this is the case, one must look at both commercial players and speculators. In spite 
of this theoretical divide, commercial players take some speculative positions, using the inside 
information about the market to bet on prospective price changes. By assuming some 
speculative risk in the market, hedgers transmit their information on the direction of prices. The 
same holds true for speculators striving to predict where prices are heading. Overall, the future 
price at which the market clears supply and demand is considered a fair price.  THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY IN COMMODITY AND COMMODITY DERIVATIVES MARKETS | 5 
 
Sometimes increased participation in futures markets can heighten volatility insofar as 
information travels more quickly. Some would argue that the fact that information is transmitted 
quickly allows for arbitrage opportunities to be quickly spotted and neutralised. The evidence on 
whether commodity derivatives increase or reduce price volatility is contradictory.
6 In spite of 
this, futures markets perform a fundamental price discovery function coalescing around futures 
prices all the market information regarding that commodity. Considering that commodity cash 
markets are professionals’ markets in which few actors have good information, futures prices 
convey actual and expected supply, demand and inventory to a larger audience. When 
newspapers announce fluctuations in the price of oil, for instance, they generally refer to the 
price of the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) future contract traded on the New York Mercantile 
Exchange (NYMEX) rather than mentioning the crude oil spot price, highlighting the 
importance that futures prices have for the economy. 
 
Box 1. Example of Commodity Derivative Contract 
Let us suppose the spot price of wheat today is €180/ton and the 3-month future price is €180/ton. 
Futures and spot prices rarely converge, but this example would facilitate understanding. Stocking and 
opportunity costs of holding inventories are ignored. The wheat future contract is 100 tons and the crop 
has yielded 500 tons of wheat to the producer. The producer expects the spot price to fall further. 
Therefore he sells 10 future contracts with 5 uncovered contracts. He assumes some speculative risk 
because he believes he has good information. 
On the contrary, by researching on data of supply, demand and inventories of wheat, a non-commercial 
player has come to the conclusion that future spot prices are bound to rise. He will then take on the risk 
of the commercial player by buying his 10 futures contracts. Let us assume the speculator is right and 
the spot price rises to €200/ton after 3 months. The producer has locked in the price of wheat and he 
will receive after 3 months: 
€180 x 1,000 = €180,000 
The producer only holds 500 tons of wheat and he will have to buy another 500 tons in the cash market 
to meet his obligation at 
€200 x 500 = €100,000 
Thus, he sold his crop of 500 tons for  
€180,000 - €100,000 = €80,000 
The crop could have been sold immediately on the spot market when harvested at €180/ton, hence he 
made a loss   
(€180 x 500) - €80,000 = € 10,000 
The speculator has to pay €180,000 to the producer, but the wheat is now worth 
€200 x 1,000 = €200,000 
Therefore, the speculator receives the wheat and immediately sells it on the spot market, making a 
profit of 
€200,000 – €180,000 = €20,000 
The producer has foregone €20,000 of unrealised profit and made a €10,000 loss on the original crop. 
However, he has locked in the price of wheat, hedging against a price decline while assuming some 
speculative risk. 
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The spot-futures price relation is a critical measure in commodity derivatives. The difference 
between the spot and future price is called basis. The basis represents the cost of carrying a 
riskless arbitrage between the cash and future markets, including storage, transportation, 
opportunity and financing cost. If the basis does not vary, it means that spot and futures prices 
are perfectly correlated and the basis risk is zero. Were that to be true, hedging would be perfect 
and market actors would be able to completely offset price risk in secondary markets (Geman, 
2005, p. 14). However, the basis shows high volatility because of the variability of storage costs 
and of convenience yields. Storage costs depend directly on the level of stocks: when storage 
space is scarce because of high inventories, its cost increases (Working, 1934).  
The convenience yield is the benefit accrued by the holder of a physical stock of a commodity. 
The benefits may be speculative – buying or holding the commodity when prices are low and 
selling it when prices are high – or industrial – meeting unexpected demand and avoiding 
disruption in distribution or production. The convenience yield is inversely correlated to interest 
rates, since the cost of capital will determine the opportunity cost of investing in the commodity; 
and it is decreased by the cost of storage: the higher the cost of storage, the lower the 
convenience yield. This stems from the observation that when storage costs are high, the level 
of stocks is high. Hence, the advantage of holding inventories when stocks are high is low. 
When the basis is positive the market is in contango; when it is negative the market is in 
backwardation.
7 The basis represents a guide in inventory control, indicating how much the 
market values holding inventories.    
For the futures market to function properly, the underlying commodity has to be homogeneous 
enough to allow contract standardisation. In the case of BIFFEX, for example, the diversity of 
the routes traders use to ship their goods did not allow for enough contract standardisation. This 
left buyers of BIFFEX futures contracts with substantial risk even after hedging, and the 
contract’s lack of liquidity led to its demise. On the contrary, successful futures contracts’ 
underlying assets are homogenous commodities with easily interchangeable qualities such as 
crude oil, corn and natural gas. 
Table 1. World’s most traded commodities by number of futures traded 
  Volume, Number of contracts traded   
Rank  Commodity  2007  2006  % change from previous year 
1 Crude  Oil  253,715,412  160,042,943  +  58.5% 
2 Corn  119,038,170  117,219,536  +  1.6% 
3 Soybeans  93,039,576  44,794,047  +  107.7% 
4  Soybean Meal  76,936,516  40,913,814  + 88.0% 
5 Sugar  70,779,566  48,225,932  +  46.8% 
6 Wheat  66,047,895  39,442,523  +  67.5% 
7 Gold  62,792,565  51,541,207  +  21.8% 
8  Natural Gas  59,076,945  57,717,050  + 2.4% 
9 Copper  57,031,798  32,859,329  +  73.6% 
10 Rubber  49,490,827  36,291,679  +  36.4% 
11 Aluminium  40,230,422  36,420,118  +  10.5% 
12 Gas  Oil  36,523,730  31,032,804  +  17.7% 
13 Gasoline  30,971,279  17,895,708  +  73.1% 
14 Soybean  Oil  27,262,059  20,709,263  +  31.6% 
                                                      
7 Contango refers to a situation in which futures prices are higher than spot prices. Backwardation refers 
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15 Zinc  26,323,848  12,269,286  +  114.6% 
16 Silver  23,416,398  20,698,591  +  13.1% 
17  Heating Oil   18,078,976  13,990,589  + 29.2% 
18 Coffee  10,958,189  10,362,645  +  5.7% 
19  Live Cattle  9,522,395  8,601,710  + 10.7% 
20 Cotton  9,294,712  6,594,563  +  40.9% 
21 Platinum  9,169,890  11,018,069  -16.8% 
22 Pepper  7,681,015  4,579,906  +  67.7% 
23 Lean  hog  7,264,832  6,481,001  +  12.1% 
24 Cocoa  6,654,679  6,264,548  +  6.2% 
25 Guar  Seeds  6,504,242  14,095,704  -53.9% 
Sources: Commodity Research Bureau, author’s own calculations. 
The spot market for the commodity has to be competitive, that is no single producer, consumer 
or trader can offer or demand such a large quantity that its actions affect market prices. If the 
market structure is not competitive, large players can manipulate spot prices and abuse futures 
markets to make illicit profits.
8 In turn, this can decrease market confidence in pricing 
mechanisms and reduces participation.  
The  actors  in futures market can be divided in three categories: arbitrageurs, hedgers and 
speculators. Arbitrageurs connect cash and futures markets by pursuing arbitrages cash and 
carry and between different maturities. In the case of cash and carry, arbitrageurs sell a forward 
contract, buy the commodity in the cash market by taking out a loan, repay the storage costs and 
the loan with the proceeds from the forward, and make a profit. A similar technique is used for 
arbitrages between maturities. These operations keep cash and futures prices at different 
maturities in constant interaction and that is why futures prices and spot prices converge at 
maturity.
9 Hedgers need derivative contracts to transfer the risk in commodity price to another 
actor. Speculators are the actors willing to assume that risk, providing liquidity to the contracts. 
Hedgers and arbitrageurs generally operate with contract maturities below one year: commodity 
derivatives with longer maturity have low open interest.  
As discussed in the box above, commercial players with an interest in the underlying physical 
commodity do not fall exclusively under the ‘hedger’ category. By the same token, financial 
actors who have entered the physical market may have to ‘hedge’ their positions. Moreover, 
some commercial players employ swap dealers in order to obtain OTC tailor-made contracts. 
Swap dealers are generally financial institutions such as banks that assume commercial players’ 
risk with OTC contracts, offsetting it with exchange-traded derivatives. An example would help 
to illustrate this point. No futures exchange offers a liquid future contract for jet fuel. Airline 
Company A is in need of hedging the price risk of jet fuel, but it must use crude oil futures to 
offset its exposure. However, A is left with substantial risk after hedging, since crude oil and jet 
fuel prices may diverge and transportation costs from the contract’s point of delivery to A’s 
storage facility are not covered. Hence, A buys an OTC contract from swap dealer B, which 
tailors the contract to A’s needs. B’s superior expertise in financial markets and greater appetite 
for risk drives this choice. B is able to hedge the risk associated with the spread between crude 
oil and jet fuel prices as well as transportation costs between the exchange’s point of delivery 
                                                      
8 One of the most effective ways to manipulate markets in commodities is a technique known as “corner 
and squeeze.” See glossary for a full explanation. 
9 This characteristic is shared by most commodities. There are cases, however, when these two prices do 
not converge: this may reflect the risk inherent in arbitrage operations.   8 | PIERO CINQUEGRANA 
 
and A’s storage facility. In sum, in today’s markets the boundaries between hedgers, speculators 
and arbitrageurs are increasingly blurred (CFTC, 2008).  
In the last decade, new financial players have entered commodity derivatives markets through 
commodity index funds, exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and exchange-trade notes (ETNs) for 
commodities. The underlying assumption of this trend is that commodity prices have been – 
historically – negatively correlated with stocks and bonds prices, providing portfolio 
diversification and a hedge against inflation. Moreover, they are said to provide a hedge against 
‘event risk’, i.e. to give returns in case financial assets are underperforming due to financial 
crises or geopolitical events. However, these assumptions do not take into account that as more 
and more investors enter commodity markets, the correlation between stocks, bonds and 
commodities prices is likely to increase. As current financial conditions show, investors do not 
differentiate between equity, debt securities or alternative investments when they have to 
service their debt obligations or meet margin calls: herd behaviour and de-leveraging can take a 
toll on commodities as well.  
The investment strategy of index funds, ETFs and ETNs is generally to passively follow a 
commodity index, benefiting from spot returns and roll yields.
10 In the US, this development 
raised concerns about the role of index traders in feeding ever-rising commodity prices because 
of their long-only strategy. According to one oft-cited source, assets allocated to commodity 
indexes have shot up to $260 billion in March 2008 from $13 billion at the end of 2003.
11 The 
CFTC has estimated the notional value of index trading to be lower, placing it at $200 billions 
as of 30 June 2008 (CFTC, 2008, p. 21). Of $200 billions, 24% was held by index funds, 42% 
was held by pension funds and endowment funds, 9% was held by sovereign wealth funds and 
25% was held by retail investors (ibid).  
3.  Commodity and Commodity Derivatives Markets 
Commodity markets have greatly different characteristics, resulting from chemical-physical 
properties of the commodity, market structure, market organisation, regulation and the 
economics of the industry involved. Based on these elements, commodities are divided into 
three categories: agricultural, metals and energy. This section discusses each category in order. 
Table 2. World’s most traded commodities by type and by volume of futures 
2007  % of total  2006  % of total  Type 
479,187,728 41% 332,982,389 39% agricultural 
398,366,342 34% 280,679,094 33%  energy 
218,964,921 19% 164,806,600 19%  metals 
81,288,952 7% 71,594,482 8%  soft 
1,177,807,943 100%  850,062,565  100%  all 
Sources: Commodity Research Bureau, author’s own calculation. 
                                                      
10 See glossary for terms explanation.  
11 Testimony of Michael W. Masters, Managing Member/Portfolio Manager of Masters Capital 
Management, LLC before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations, United States House of Representatives, 23 June 2008. THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY IN COMMODITY AND COMMODITY DERIVATIVES MARKETS | 9 
 
3.1 Agriculturals 
Worldwide, futures on agricultural commodities as a group have the highest volume of trading 
(see Table 2). This fact may reflect the origins of futures markets from agricultural products or 
it may be linked to high price volatility due to meteorological events and seasonality. Another 
explanation could be that markets have more confidence in the pricing mechanism of underlying 
assets because of a relatively lower concentration in the industry. 
Agricultural products can be further divided into grains (corn, soybean and its derived products, 
and wheat), soft (cocoa, coffee, cotton, and sugar), citrus fruit (oranges, frozen orange juice) and 
livestock (cattle, hogs and pork bellies). This section gives an overview of the market structure, 
market organisation, and physical and derivative markets of agricultural products.   
Market structure 
Market structure refers to the degree of competitiveness and informational efficiency of cash 
markets. Each agricultural product corresponds to different market structures, but there is an 
overall tendency in agricultural markets towards concentration, especially in the industries of 
seeds, international trading, food-processing and retail supermarkets. International trading in 
soft commodities, in particular, is dominated by a small number of firms. For instance, the 
global coffee chain has four international traders and three international roasters controlling 
39% and 45% of world’s market, respectively. In cocoa, 10 trading houses control the London 
market – the world’s largest where international prices are formed – and the six largest 
chocolate manufacturers account for 50% of world sales (FAO, 2004). However, it would be a 
mistake to consider agricultural markets as monopolistic or even cartelised. In effect, markets 
for livestock, grains and citrus fruits show a lower concentration and the number of producers 
results in sufficient competition. Moreover, in developed countries, national governments 
collect statistics about world demand, supply, inventories and trade, and publish periodic 
reference prices on which cash transactions may take place. Futures prices give a clear 
indication of market expectations and aid in the transmission of local price changes to 
international markets. This reduces the scope for price fixing or anticompetitive behaviours.  
Market organisation and characteristics of physical and financial markets 
Agricultural cash markets are decentralised OTC markets with bilateral contracts using either 
published prices or futures prices +/- a differential. The International Coffee Organization and 
the International Cocoa Organization in London publish daily prices collected from 
commitments of brokers across the globe. In other instances, such as livestock and citrus fruits, 
price dynamics are more regional. Soft commodities are the most heavily-traded because they 
are produced in tropical regions and then exported to developed countries. For instance, world 
coffee exports represent over 80% of world production (FAS-USDA, 2008). Grains and citrus 
fruits are somewhere in between – with some production consumed locally and some exported 
to international markets – and livestock markets are the least integrated.  
Derivatives transactions on agricultural commodities take place mainly on centralised 
exchanges. The main futures exchanges for agricultural products are the Chicago Board of 
Trade (CBOT) – owned by the CME Group – with liquid contracts for corn, soybean, soybean 
oil, soybean meal; the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CMEX) – also owned by the CME Group 
– with fairly liquid contracts in lean hogs and live cattle; the New York Board of Trade 
(NYBOT) – owned by the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) – with liquid contracts in cocoa, 
coffee, white sugar, and cotton; Euronext LIFFE with liquid contracts in cocoa, coffee and 
white sugar; and finally the Kansas City Board of Trade (KBOT) with liquid contracts in wheat. 
All contracts are priced in dollars, except futures on cocoa that are priced in sterling. Futures 
markets in agricultural commodities tend to see a lower presence of banks and other financial 10 | PIERO CINQUEGRANA 
 
institutions with respect to metals and energy: local producers, agribusiness companies and 
specialised traders are the most active players (Geman, 2005, p. 163). 
3.2 Metals 
Metals markets are quite distinct from agricultural and energy markets. In these two latter 
groups of commodities, the physical form at the downstream level (retail) and upstream level 
(wholesale) does not change much. Cocoa may become a chocolate bar and crude oil may 
become gasoline, but the amount of processing from industrial metals to cars or electronic 
components is infinitely more complex and multi-layered (Geman, 2005, p. 171). Hence, the 
raw material price does not have a major impact on the finished good and the short-term 
demand for metals is highly inelastic.
12 For the purposes of this paper only the most actively 
traded non-ferrous base metals (copper, aluminium, tin, lead, zinc, and nickel) and precious 
metals (gold, silver, platinum and palladium) are reviewed. 
Market structure 
Competition in the production of non-ferrous base metals and precious metals is fairly limited. 
Global aluminium production is concentrated in six dominant firms; production for platinum 
and palladium is concentrated in two countries with dominant firms: South Africa and Russia. 
In one recent study, Slade and Thille (2006) found relatively high market concentration in most 
non-ferrous base metals, except lead. Moreover, they found a statistically significant positive 
correlation between market concentration and price levels. That is, the higher the competition in 
the industry, the lower the prices. 
Market organisation and characteristics of physical and financial markets  
Non-ferrous base metals cash markets are decentralised OTC markets using generally reference 
prices quoted on the London Metal Exchange (LME) +/- a differential. Gold and silver are 
traded OTC, and the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) is the main hub for cash 
transactions, also publishing widely-followed spot prices (so-called fix price) and forward rates 
(so-called gofo rate). Non-ferrous metals have high storage costs and their demand is closely 
related to the business cycle. Hence, fundamentals are likely to be a major factor in determining 
prices. By contrast, gold is akin to financial commodities in light of its historical role as anchor 
of the monetary system and its negligible storage costs. Gold is seen as an inflation hedge, and 
gold prices have complex interrelations with the euro/dollar exchange rate, interest rates and oil 
prices (Malliaris & Malliaris, 2008). Silver, platinum and palladium trade generally with gold, 
but their price dynamics are rather different because they do not share the gold status of quasi-
international currency.    
LME is a centralised forward exchange with liquid contracts in copper, aluminium, tin, lead, 
zinc and nickel. All contracts are physically delivered, in the sense that they cannot be 
financially-settled. However, less than 1% of LME contracts result in actual delivery as most 
players offset their positions before contract expiration. Other futures markets for metals are: 
COMEX, a division of NYMEX – which was recently acquired by the CME Group – offers 
liquid contracts in gold, silver and copper; the Tokyo Commodity Exchange (TOCOM) with 
liquid contracts in platinum and gold; and the LBMA with forward contracts in gold. Futures 
markets in metals, especially in gold and other precious metals, see important investments of 
banks, exchange-traded funds specialised in precious metals, and commodity funds.  
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3.3 Energy 
Futures in energy have received the most political attention because of the critical importance of 
crude oil and its derived products for the world economy. Crude oil is the single most traded 
commodity in terms of volume of futures contracts exchanged, and its price is a fundamental 
benchmark for inflation expectations and worldwide market sentiment. Moreover, derivatives 
markets in energy are the most sophisticated, witnessing a large participation of financial 
players such as banks, asset managers and insurance companies. The energy sector encompasses 
crude oil and its derived products, natural gas, electricity and coal.  
Market structure 
Energy markets are quite distinct from each other. The crude oil and the coal markets are global; 
the natural gas market and refined products markets are largely regional, whereas the electricity 
market is sub-regional. These differing market structures depend on the cost of transporting gas 
over long distances; on the non-storability of electricity; on differing environmental legislations; 
and on the economics of refining capacity
13 and extraction. However, the crude oil price is a 
unifying factor insofar as all energy products are influenced by its movements. For instance, 
long-term natural gas contracts in Europe have their prices tied to reported spot prices for fuel 
oil and gasoil (Geman, 2005, p. 202). Moreover, changes in crude oil prices affect both 
electricity and coal prices. 
Energy markets witness high levels of concentration in production, but – unlike metals – this is 
due to the location of reserves rather than economies of scale. Although its domination of the 
world oil market has diminished since the 1970s, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries’ (OPEC) production still represents 37.3% of global supply and 78% of proved 
reserves. Saudi Arabia plays a critical role in the crude oil market, since it is the only country 
with significant spare capacity – a characteristic for which pundits call it “swing producer.” 
Considering that non-OPEC supply growth is stalling, it is likely that most growth in production 
will come from OPEC countries in the near future.  
Market dynamics for natural gas are more regional because of the high transportation costs 
associated with Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), though oil prices may have an impact. The 
biggest natural gas producers are the US, Canada, Russia, Iran and Qatar, but proved reserves 
are mostly located in Russia, Iran and Qatar. Although some integration is taking place in 
Europe, electricity markets are largely national with concentration due to high barriers to entry 
and difficulties in transportation.  
Table 3. Commodity markets by type 
Type of 
commodity 
Market  Market 
Structure 
Market 
Organisation 
Characteristics 
Cash Competitive  OTC,  decentralised 
Grains and soft global; citrus and 
livestock regional. Futures prices 
perform price discovery.  Agriculturals 
Derivative /  Futures,  centralised  CMEX, CBOT, NYBOT, 
Euronext  
                                                      
13 Oil refineries cannot process all types of oil, and this has an impact on trade patterns. For instance, it 
may be more cost-effective to import light sweet oil from distant regions than to build refining capacity to 
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Cash Oligopolistic 
OTC, decentralised 
and LME forward 
market, centralised 
Pricing based on LME prices with 
long-term contracts, global in 
scope  Metals 
Derivative /  Futures,  centralised  LME and, to a lesser extent, 
Shanghai Metal Exchange.  
Cash 
Production 
oligopolistic, 
distribution 
and extraction 
low 
competition 
OTC decentralised  Pricing based on information 
providers as well as futures prices 
Energy  
Derivative / 
Predominantly OTC, 
decentralised; 
substantial activity in 
futures 
NYMEX and ICE 
Market organisation and characteristics of physical and financial markets 
The crude oil spot market is a decentralised OTC market that is global in scope. By contrast, the 
natural gas and electricity spot markets in continental Europe are characterised by long-term 
contracts associated with state-owned companies. On the other hand, in the UK, Scandinavia 
and the US liquid spot and forward markets in electricity and gas have emerged because of the 
unbundling of generation and distribution of electricity and gas price liberalisation. Platts is a 
critical player in energy markets, collecting and distributing data from principals and brokers to 
form reference spot and forward prices for a wide variety of products: from crude oil to natural 
gas; from electric power to coal prices. Platts’ prices are widely used in conjunction with futures 
prices (+/- differential) to stipulate cash contracts. 
NYMEX and ICE are the most important centralised exchanges for energy futures. NYMEX 
boasts liquid futures contracts on WTI crude oil, natural gas, heating oil, gasoline, and various 
contracts based on differentials between qualities of energy products (so-called crack spreads). 
ICE offers liquid futures contracts on Brent crude oil, financially-settled WTI crude oil, gas oil, 
and natural gas. The Multi Commodity Exchange of India has some liquid contracts in energy, 
but its futures prices are not used internationally for price discovery. Futures contracts in 
electricity are still scarcely developed, although they are growing rapidly. In recent years, OTC 
transactions have come to dominate energy derivatives markets.    
4.  Regulation of Commodity Derivatives 
Although a considerable part of commodity derivatives is traded on regulated exchanges, the 
majority of transactions take place over-the-counter or on multilateral trading facilities (MTF).
14 
By definition, OTC transactions are less supervised than on-exchange contracts, which – to 
different degrees – are cleared and monitored for market abuse. This section gives an overview 
of regulation concerning the three main global commodity hubs: London, New York and 
Chicago. To this end, it will first explore EU regulation to then regulation in the UK. The 
second part looks at US regulation.   
                                                      
14 Given the lack of data on commodity derivatives, it is difficult to assess the share of OTC/exchange-
traded commodity derivatives. The Bank for International Settlements does not provide notional amounts 
outstanding for exchange-traded derivatives, but solely for OTC commodity derivatives. The FSA (2007, 
17) reports that 85% of commodity derivatives take place OTC. However, this is likely to apply mostly to 
energy derivatives, as agriculturals and metals derivatives are traded extensively on-exchange.   THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY IN COMMODITY AND COMMODITY DERIVATIVES MARKETS | 13 
 
4.1 EU  regulation 
The Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) that entered into force on 1 November 
2007 across EU member states includes – unlike its predecessor – commodity derivatives in its 
definition of financial instruments. Regulated exchanges and MTFs do not have pre- and post-
trade transparency obligations for commodity derivatives.
15 Under articles 2(1)(i) and (k) some 
specialist commodity firms are outside the scope of regulation, and, as a consequence, do not 
have to comply with capital requirements,
16 organisational requirements and conduct-of-
business rules. Exempted firms do not enjoy the passport, but they are still free to provide 
services by establishing subsidiaries. By contrast, banks, other investment firms and some 
specialist firms active in commodity derivatives markets fall under MiFID, and by registering in 
accordance with the home-country principle they can provide services across EU countries 
without further authorisation. The exemptions for certain specialist commodity firms stem from 
three related considerations. First, commercial firms should be allowed to manage their 
commodity price risk without stringent regulation. Second, commodity markets are largely 
wholesale markets with minimal retail involvement: professionals do not need the same level of 
protection as consumers. Third, commodity firms pose a low systemic risk as highlighted by the 
limited consequences on systemic stability of the bankruptcy of firms such as Amaranth 
Advisors LLC, Metallgesellschaft AG, Enron and Refco.
17    
The MiFID exemptions as well as the inclusion of pre- and post-trade transparency obligations 
for commodity derivatives are currently under review at the DG Internal Market and Services 
and DG TREN of the European Commission. The Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(CESR) and the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) published joint advice to 
the European Commission after this had been requested in December 2006 (CESR-CEBS, 
2008). CESR/CEBS’ advice broadly proposes to leave the exemptions in place for commodity 
firms but to clarify the extant wording, and to slightly modify the client categorisation regime. 
Moreover, it recommends to devise “adequate financial resources requirements and qualitative 
risk management” rather than a full application of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) in 
order to cope with possible systemic risks.
18 Finally, it suggests not extending pre- and post-
trade transparency obligations for commodity derivatives contained in MiFID.   
As far as market abuse is concerned, the present regulatory framework does not cover most of 
the market. In effect, the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) does not apply to MTFs and OTC 
transactions, raising concerns about possible manipulation occurring in these markets. 
Furthermore, the Commission’s sector enquiry into European electricity and gas markets have 
found evidence of a lack of integration and competition, mistrust of pricing mechanisms, 
concentration and low transparency (EC, 2007). Against this background, CESR and the 
European Regulators’ Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) have called for a tailor-made 
market abuse regime and transparency disclosure obligations for electricity and gas markets in 
Europe, especially for the physical market (CESR-ERGEG, 2008).  
                                                      
15 However, article 65(1) of MiFID mandates that the Commission consider whether to extend pre- and 
post-trade transparency obligations to securities other than shares. The Commission decided against 
implementing this obligation for fixed-income securities and it is about to publish its decision on 
commodity derivatives.   
16 Articles 45 and 48 of the Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD). 
17 As some have pointed out, the collapse of Amaranth and Enron brought disruption to the natural gas 
and electricity markets, respectively. However, their collapses did not have systemic implications. 
18 It should be noted that this is similar to the UK approach.  14 | PIERO CINQUEGRANA 
 
Overall, EU regulation of commodity derivatives contracts is light-touch, relying on the 
supervision of actors rather than the markets themselves. Moreover the market abuse regime 
leaves OTC and MTFs uncovered, a fact that raises substantial concerns about possible market 
manipulation.  
4.2 UK  regulation 
Given London’s global importance as a commodity hub with global shares of 14% of OTC 
contracts and 15% of exchange-traded derivatives, it would be relevant here to briefly outline 
UK regulation on the matter. The British regulatory framework is certainly based on MiFID, but 
with a slightly wider scope. Out of 79 firms operating in UK commodity derivatives markets, 58 
fall within MiFID and 21 are MiFID-exempt. Those firms that must not apply the CRD – 
whether under MiFID or exempt – are subject to ‘Chapter 3’ capital requirements, which were 
originally devised for metals firms. However, one Energy Market Participant (EMP) meeting 
certain stringent requirements has a capital carve-out. Oil Market Participants (OMPs), EMPs 
and MiFID-exempt firms must still abide by FSA’s high level Principles for Businesses, Senior 
management arrangements, Systems and Controls, and Threshold Conditions (FSA, 2007, p. 
26). The monitoring and reporting of market abuse as well as the drafting of transparency rules 
are delegated to exchanges or MTFs, which have the obligation to refer to the FSA in case of 
suspicious activity. Finally, in keeping with the EU regulation, the supervision of OTC 
transactions takes place indirectly through the actors rather than through the supervision of the 
markets themselves.  
4.3 US  regulation 
The US has had a long history of regulating commodity derivatives: the Anti-Gold Futures Act 
of 1864 and the Grain Futures Act of 1922 are the oldest examples. Today, the pertinent legal 
acts concerning commodities in the US are the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA), the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, and the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA).  
The CEA is still the centrepiece legislation of today’s regulatory framework, though it was 
repeatedly modified to adapt to changing circumstances. Since its approval, CEA’s primary 
objectives have been to prevent speculation from exacerbating price volatility and to protect 
small investors (Greenspan, 1997). To achieve these objectives, CEA distinguished between 
‘bona-fide hedgers’ – commercial entities in need of risk transfer – and ‘speculators’ – financial 
actors subject to speculative limits. Moreover, it established an authorisation regime for brokers 
(‘futures commission merchants’) in order to protect consumers. The underlying assumption of 
regulation was that excessive speculation is an undesirable feature of futures markets.     
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 enlarged the definition of 
‘commodities’ to include financial products, services, and intangible assets as well as physical 
commodities. By contrast, in EU regulation the definition of ‘commodities’ includes only 
physical commodities. More recently with the CFMA, the US has embraced a tiered approach of 
regulatory oversight of derivatives markets. On 18 June 2008, the CFTC Reauthorization Act of 
2008 was enacted to close the so-called ‘Enron Loophole.’ However, the statute only partially 
achieved its objective because OTC transactions on exempt commodities are still not entirely 
monitored. The CFMA established four market tiers, increasingly regulated in view of the 
likelihood of market manipulation and the nature of market participants: excluded markets, THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY IN COMMODITY AND COMMODITY DERIVATIVES MARKETS | 15 
 
OTC transactions in exempt commodities, exempt markets and designated contract markets 
(DCMs).
19  
Excluded markets consist of derivative contracts whose underlying assets are ‘excluded 
commodities’, and that are exchanged OTC or on electronic trading platforms between 
sophisticated counterparties (‘eligible contract participants’).
20 Excluded markets do not have 
reporting obligations and no market monitoring is in place.  
OTC transactions in ‘exempt commodities’ are derivative contracts traded bilaterally (no trading 
facility involved) subject to the same set of rules as the previous category, except that anti-
manipulation and partial anti-fraud authority rests with the CFTC.
21 However, it is hard to see 
how the CFTC could enforce anti-manipulation and anti-fraud rules, given its limited authority 
over OTC transactions in exempt commodities. This market tier includes transactions conducted 
with swap dealers in exempt commodities.
22  
The third market tier is exempt markets. These transactions are exempt from most but not all 
CEA provisions: they are not subject to accountability and position limits but transactions must 
be notified to the CFTC. Anti-fraud and anti-manipulation apply fully, but the CFTC has no 
power to sanction suspicious behaviour, it can only issue special calls. Exempt markets can be 
either ‘exempt boards of trade’ or ‘exempt commercial markets’. Exempt boards of trade are 
facilities dealing transactions in excluded commodities such as financial commodities between 
eligible counterparties; exempt commercial markets are electronic facilities dealing on a 
principal-to-principal basis in derivative contracts on exempt commodities only between bona-
fide hedgers (‘eligible commercial entities’).  
Exempt commercial markets are popularly referred to as the ‘Enron Loophole’ because energy 
and metals derivatives traded on these venues are subject to limited supervision. Following 
criticism that exempt commercial markets were being used to circumvent legislation and that 
they were causing a price bubble, the US Congress has enacted the CFTC Reauthorization Act 
of 2008 to extend CFTC powers to cover contracts with “significant price discovery function” in 
exempt commercial markets. Thus, the CFTC now has the authority to single out exempt 
commercial markets that perform a significant price discovery and ask them to impose position 
and accountability limits for the contracts as well as certain disclosure requirements. It remains 
to be seen how extensively the CFTC will interpret these powers.
23 
The fourth market tier is designated contract markets (DCMs). DCMs are fully regulated under 
the CEA and have to submit weekly commitment of trades to the CFTC. Moreover, the CFTC 
has the legislative authority to step in and ask to reduce positions if it deems that an actor went 
beyond authorised limits. Because they are fully regulated markets, DCMs allow retail investors 
to access their trading facilities. Certain ‘foreign boards of trade’ – exchanges physically located 
                                                      
19 A further category – the derivative transaction execution facility – was established, but no entity has 
registered under this denomination, so will not be discussed here.  
20 ‘Excluded commodities’ are all financial commodities, intangible assets and services. Excluded 
markets include among others: credit default swaps, interest rate swaps, foreign exchange swaps and the 
like.   
21 ‘Exempt commodities’ are energy, metals, chemicals, pollution allowances, wood pulp and others.   
22 For example, index funds, ETNs, and ETFs trading metals and energy commodities replicating an 
index would use commodity swaps and fall under this category.   
23 For more information on the changes enacted, see http://www.sidley.com/files/News/0e124f9a-8f3f-
48e5-8e75-b57238434d89/Presentation/NewsAttachment/baf03505-8a7a-466a-bb96-b88223f63878/ 
MarketRegulation0608.pdf and http://www.dechert.com/library/FS-14_8-08_CFTC_Reauthorization_ 
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outside US territory and subject to foreign supervision – can ask the CFTC to issue a ‘no-action 
letter’ in order to become DCMs. If the foreign board of trade meets certain requirements such 
as adequate supervision and appropriate internal procedures, the venue can operate as a DCM 
without CFTC supervision, and US brokers and customers can access the facilities. This is 
popularly referred as the ‘London Loophole’ or ‘Dubai Loophole’ because while US clients can 
access the facilities, the CFTC does not police the markets but cooperates on information-
sharing with foreign authorities.  
US supervision of commodity markets appears to be more rigorous than its European 
equivalent. However, given that excluded markets and OTC contracts in exempt commodities 
are not completely monitored, only DCMs and, to a lesser extent, exempt commercial markets 
can be considered as being subject to firm supervision. Nevertheless, compared to the EU, US 
regulation provides a more comprehensive, yet extremely complex, market abuse regime for 
financial and physical commodities.  
5. Policy  Options 
From the analysis outlined above, a very varied picture of commodities markets emerges. In 
terms of actors, market structures, market organisation, regulation and diversity of commodities 
themselves, it is tempting just to discard the possibility of looking at commodities markets as a 
coherent whole. In effect, some argue that commodities are so diverse that studying them 
together or trying to regulate them as a group risks obscuring the specificities of each one 
commodity. Yet, as this paper has attempted to demonstrate, commodities share fundamental 
characteristics that are common to no other set of goods or services. These are: quality 
standardisation, exhaustibility, the importance of stocks, spot-futures prices interconnectedness, 
sizeable transportation and storage costs.  
Once established commodities markets can be analysed as a group, it is imperative to explore 
the consequences of the growing financialisation of commodities. Whether a massive inflow of 
speculative capital in commodity derivatives can aid and abet the price volatility of spot prices 
is a legitimate question to ask. From a policy perspective, the fact that so many developing and 
less-developed countries rely so heavily on the export of raw materials to earn foreign exchange 
makes the question all the more pressing. Furthermore, a considerable part of commodity 
producers are poor farmers with no access to sophisticated financial instruments to hedge 
against price volatility. Finally, the fact that so much uncertainty surrounds the issue of 
commodities raises the question of whether more information and transparency of this sector 
would be welcome. 
In effect, the debate has seen two sides exchanging intellectual jabs, and both camps boast 
eminent voices in their ranks. George Soros and Michael Masters
24 led the side arguing that 
speculation is to blame for massive swings in commodity prices (Soros, 2008). Guillermo Calvo 
and Jeffrey Frankel had a more subtle and indirect argument: low interest rates are the culprit, 
driving financial players to increase commodity assets (Calvo, 2008; Frankel, 2008). On the 
other side of the debate, Paul Krugman, the Interagency Task Force on Commodity Markets, 
and the financial press have dismissed theories about speculation and pointed to the historical 
price volatility in commodities as well as fundamentals to explain the surge in commodity prices 
(Krugman, 2008; ITF, 2008; The Economist, 2008; Financial Times, 2008b). Moreover, they 
argue that commodities that are not exchange-traded such as iron ore, molybdenum and cobalt 
have witnessed higher price changes than exchange-traded commodities. However, some 
commentators and even regulators themselves have emphasised that both explanations are 
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possible because we do not know enough about futures markets (Dunn, 2008; Hasset, 2008; 
CFTC, 2008, pp. 60-62). 
Given the uncertainties surrounding the issue, it would be foolhardy to move decisively in 
favour of the strict regulation of commodity markets. However, more transparency is needed to 
understand the drivers of commodity and commodity derivative markets and to assuage public 
concerns about speculation, especially in light of present market conditions.  
First, the social utility of futures markets lies in the process of price discovery. Arguably the 
opacity of commodity and commodity derivatives markets prevents market participants from 
completely trusting the pricing mechanisms of commodities. In this uncertain environment and 
without reliable data on the drivers of physical markets and of derivative markets, a 
considerable number of companies and individuals are sceptical about the soundness of 
commodity prices’ dynamics. For example, the European Commission found considerable 
evidence of this mistrust in gas and electricity markets (EC, 2007). The same could be said of 
WTI crude oil futures prices that went from around $94 in November 2007 to a peak of $147 in 
July 2008 to drop below $55 in November 2008. In 8 months prices went up by 56% and in less 
than 5 months they declined by 62%. Even for commodity standards, this year’s volatility has 
been unprecedented. Moreover, some market participants have maintained that the entry of 
financial players weakens the price discovery of futures markets because they buy and sell 
contracts regardless of fundamentals (Masters, 2008). This fact, it is argued, augments the 
correlation of commodity prices with financial variables and reduces the purported advantage of 
portfolio diversification. In light of all these elements, more transparency would restore market 
confidence and help to clarify whether speculation is to blame for aiding and abetting price 
volatility.  
Second, heightened transparency would boost the informational efficiency of commodity 
markets. Informational efficiency means that prices reflect all the available information across 
markets. Today the exact share of on- and off-exchange contracts is not known and easily 
comparable data on volumes of futures contracts traded and cash prices do not exist. The Bank 
for International Settlement (BIS) publishes data on OTC commodity derivatives, but the 
statistics are only broken down by “gold,” “precious metals” and “other.” However, 
agriculturals, industrial metals and energy are increasingly traded and BIS statistics do not 
capture these new trends.  Moreover, cash prices on which spot contracts are based are not 
widely disseminated. The lack of references on the movements of cash markets with respect to 
futures markets obscures commodities’ price dynamics. Publicly available and reliable statistics 
would facilitate the transmission of prices from domestic to international markets, increase 
liquidity, and improve hedging and price discovery.  
Third, more transparency would enhance the disclosure of financial risk. With the knowledge of 
the exposure to certain markets and to specific contracts, counterparties would be able to trust 
each other more. In effect, lack of transparency led to a freezing of commodity markets. Some 
oil companies and commodities firms have stopped trading altogether with banks (sic!) for fear 
of counterparty risk, drying up liquidity and making hedging and price discovery more difficult 
(Financial Times, 2008c). Thus, even long-standing players of commodities have come to fear 
the markets they are supposed to trust to transfer risk and to inform them about prices. This 
situation confirms that markets have a sub-optimal amount of information and therefore some 
sort of intervention is warranted.  
Three clear and powerful proposals to increase transparency and restore market confidence are 
advanced: 
(1) OTC transactions over a certain value (say >10 million euro) both in physical commodities 
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This critical goal can be attained through market-led initiatives, but if these fail to materialise 
regulation should be devised. Not only would clearing of OTC transactions drastically reduce 
counterparty risk with relative little cost, but it would also give a clear picture of the size, risk 
and liquidity of these markets.
25  
Some would say that concentrating risk in few clearing-houses would augment rather than 
reduce counterparty risk. However, the evidence suggests otherwise: in the history of financial 
markets, no clearing-house has ever defaulted on its obligations. Thanks to provisions such as 
daily margin calls and the distribution of losses across members in case of a counterparty 
default, the risk that the clearing-house itself would not be able to service its obligations is 
extremely low. Initiatives are underway on both sides of the Atlantic towards more 
standardisation of contracts to ensure transparency and towards the interoperability of central 
counterparties.
26 
Some others would contend that requiring the clearing of OTC transactions is excessively 
burdensome because the clearing-house may not accept complex contracts that it cannot easily 
price. But this is exactly why transactions over a certain value should be cleared. If a clearing-
house with substantial resources to back its commitments and with specific expertise in 
managing and mitigating counterparty risk will not accept a transaction, why should an eligible 
counterparty? In situations of market disruption when counterparty risk is at its peak, the opaque 
nature of the contract due to its complexity and its difficulty in pricing may pose risks to 
financial stability. What may be a bearable risk between counterparties at the individual level, if 
taken collectively in the order of thousands, could endanger the whole financial system. A move 
towards clearing may slightly reduce the flexibility and standardisation of OTC contracts, but 
the benefits to be gained in terms of stability are great.     
(2) A market abuse regime specifically tailored to commodities should be considered at the EU 
level.
27 Commodity derivative markets are no less susceptible than other financial markets to 
being manipulated, as admitted by the FSA (FSA, 2007, pp. 22-23). The cases of the Hunt 
Brothers in the silver market (1979-80), of Sumimoto in the copper market (early 90s), of Enron 
in the electricity market (2001), of British Petroleum in the propane market (2004), and of 
Amaranth in the natural gas market (2006) have shown that manipulation in physical 
commodities is not a theoretical fancy of regulators. On the contrary, as price liberalisations 
have been implemented, commodity markets are more rather than less at risk of manipulation. 
The CFTC, a federal agency solely dedicated to financial and physical commodities, prosecutes 
abuses almost on a weekly basis, with 40 new enforcement actions undertaken in the 2008 fiscal 
year involving fraud, manipulation and other misconduct.
28 The FSA also enforces anti-
manipulation rules, but to a lesser extent with 27 new market protection cases over the same 
period.
29 If the EU wants to instil trust in the pricing mechanisms of commodities across the 
                                                      
25 Central clearing for credit default swaps is already being studied and implemented. When transactions 
are cleared, clearing-houses possess consolidated information on the market. See http://www.cftc.gov/ 
stellent/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/speechandtestimony/opalukken-49.pdf and 
http://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/speechandtestimony/ 
radhakrishnansenate_ag_cds1120.pdf 
26 For more information on clearing and settlement, please refer to http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss77.pdf.  
27 This would resemble the CESR-ERGEG proposals but extend the regime to all commodities.  
28 CFTC website, accessed November 18, 2008. 
http://www.cftc.gov/newsroom/enforcementpressreleases/2008/pr5562-08.html 
29 Moreover, it should be noted that the FSA covers the functions of both the CFTC and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US. The data are taken from the FSA website, accessed November 
18, 2008. http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/ar07_08/Enforcement_report.pdf  THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY IN COMMODITY AND COMMODITY DERIVATIVES MARKETS | 19 
 
single market, all abuses should be readily detected and prevented under a single European 
framework.   
However, a simple extension of MAD to commodity derivatives would not work. Because of 
the interconnectedness with physical markets as well as the difficulty in applying the concept of 
insider trading to commodities, a specific regime would be best fit for purpose. The new regime 
would cover both physical and the derivatives markets as the two are intimately related: any 
disjunction would diminish its effectiveness. Legal requirements for standardised disclosure 
should be adopted to the extent they are necessary to prevent market abuse, especially in 
regional electricity and gas markets. The EU should also consider whether speculative limits 
similar to those enforced in the US are necessary to thwart attempts to manipulate the market, 
and whether “preventing excessive speculation” could become an objective of the new market 
abuse regime.
30 This proposal comes at the right time, as the Commission is looking into 
updating the MAD regime in the coming months.      
(3) Without increased transparency in physical markets, more information on financial 
transactions would not address the root issue. Given the tight relation of cash and futures 
commodity markets, regulators and market actors must look at ways to improve information 
flows on supply, demand, inventories, reserves and prices of commodities. To this end, the 
creation of an International Commodity Agency (ICA) incorporating the existing International 
Energy Agency (IEA) would be a clear step forward. ICA would collect and consolidate cash 
market statistics on all internationally-traded commodities, and it would be a pure consultative 
body. Cash prices are presently dispersed across multiple sources (e.g. Platts, Metal Bulletin, 
IEA, US Dept of Agriculture, National agencies, OPEC and others), and this fragmentation does 
not help the optimal functioning of commodity markets. Developed and developing countries 
could come together in agreeing on the uncontroversial issue of transparency in physical 
commodity markets.  
EU authorities should push these proposals in current G20 discussions about the overhaul of the 
global financial architecture. In combination with the reform of international financial 
institutions, the establishment of ICA and the clearing of OTC transactions would increase 
transparency, reduce counterparty risk, improve pricing mechanisms and provide robust 
supervision of commodity markets. These goals are coherent with the communiqué released on 
15 November 2008 in Washington by the leaders of the G20. Among others, the principles 
contained in the final document of “Strengthening Transparency and Accountability,” 
“Enhancing Sound Regulation,” “Promoting Integrity in Financial Markets” and “Reinforcing 
International Cooperation” are all in line with the proposals outlined here.
31  
                                                      
30 In the US, speculative limits are in place to prevent non-commercial entities from manipulating 
commodity markets. In these markets, finite supply constrains production, and positions in the secondary 
market can squeeze the physical market. In the words of an authoritative report: “Due to the 
characteristics of markets for non-financial commodities with finite supplies, however, the Working 
Group is unanimously recommending that the exclusion [from CFTC supervision] not be extended to 
agreements involving such commodities. For example, in the case of agricultural commodities, 
production is seasonal and volatile, and the underlying commodity is perishable, factors that make the 
markets for these products susceptible to supply and pricing distortions and to manipulation. There have 
also been several well-known efforts to manipulate the prices of certain metals by attempting to corner 
the cash or futures markets. Moreover, the cash market for many non-financial commodities is dependent 
on the futures market for price discovery” (Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets and the Commodity 
Exchange Act, Report of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, November 1999, 16, 
writing in italics added). No physical commodity is immune from market abuse.  
31 For access to the final communiqué, see: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/16/washington/summit-
text.html?_r=1&oref=slogin&pagewanted=all 20 | PIERO CINQUEGRANA 
 
6. Conclusion 
This research report has presented a review of the characteristics of commodities markets. 
Physical commodity markets have evolved from local fairs to regional – sometimes global – 
liquid markets. In response to wide price swings, commercial players have sought ways to 
transfer the risk of volatile prices to actors willing to assume it. Forward and futures markets are 
the result of that need. The establishment of commodity futures has also provided information 
on overall market conditions and on expectations of demand, supply and inventory, boosting 
market transparency. Futures markets’ social functions are therefore hedging  and  price 
discovery.  
However, a radical transformation of commodity markets has taken place. On the one hand, 
financial players have invested in physical commodities to gain inside knowledge of 
derivatives’ underlying assets. On the other hand, a wide spectrum of investors has been looking 
at commodities as an alternative asset class in order to provide portfolio diversification. The 
financialisation of commodities unsettles the framework regulators have employed to interpret 
these markets: the boundaries between ‘hedgers’ and ‘speculators’ have become less clear-cut. 
Some have argued that excessive speculation in commodities is the sole culprit for high 
volatility. As this paper has tried to show, this is not the case. Commodity prices have always 
been volatile, whether futures markets were in place or not. However, whether speculation aids 
and abets volatility is a different story. Informed observers disagree on this matter. It has been 
argued that a lack of data and information lies at the root of the controversy and more research 
is needed to assess whether futures market increase volatility. To achieve more transparency and 
instil market confidence three clear initiatives have been advanced: (1) clearing of  OTC 
transactions over a critical threshold whether physical or derivative (2) an EU-wide market 
abuse regime covering both physical and financial commodities (3) the establishment of an 
International Commodity Agency (ICA). 
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Glossary 
Basis. Basis is the spread between cash and future markets. It represents the premium paid for 
the risk arbitrage derived from transaction costs, storage costs, insurance and financing costs.  
BDI (Baltic Dry Index). BDI is an index operated by the London-based Baltic Exchange 
formed by 22 reference prices of bulk dry routes. These reference prices are created collecting 
bids and offers on specific routes from traders or commodity carriers.   
BIFFEX (Baltic International Freight Future Exchange). BIFFEX was a future exchange 
operated by the Baltic Exchange between 1985 and 2001 when the operator decided to cease its 
activities. 
Brent. Brent is a type of crude oil extracted in the North Sea used as a benchmark for other 
types of oil in a similar fashion of WTI.   
Cash market. The commodity cash market is for immediate or near immediate delivery 
(generally one month or less). The transaction is settled at the spot price when the delivery takes 
place. 
CIF (Carriage, Insurance and Freight). CIF is a type of commercial contract whereby the 
seller pays for carriage, insurance and freight up to a predetermined location. The buyer takes 
commercial responsibility for these costs from the agreed point of delivery to its storage 
facilities. 
CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading Commission). US federal agency competent for the 
supervision of derivative markets.  
Commodity index funds. Commodity index funds are funds that enter into contracts with swap 
dealers. These contracts track published commodity indexes such as the S&P Goldman Sachs 
Commodity Index, the Dow Jones AIG Commodity Index or the Reuters-CRB Index in order to 
gain exposure to commodities. 
‘Corner and squeeze.’ Corner and squeeze is a market manipulation technique used in 
commodities. “When ‘cornering’ a market, a manipulator builds up large positions in the 
underlying commodities market in order to create an artificial shortage. This is usually done in 
conjunction with long positions in the forward/futures market. The manipulator will then 
demand delivery of the commodity (i.e. squeeze the market). As he simultaneously withholds 
his stock of supply, the sellers of the future will find it hard to acquire enough of the commodity 
to fulfil their contracts. The manipulator can then use his market power on the commodity 
market and charge high prices for his stock of the commodity” (FSA, 2007). 
ETFs and ETNs (Exchange-Traded Funds and Exchange-Trades Notes). ETFs and ETNs 
are financial products traded on securities exchanges. They produce a return with a passive 
long-only investment in a commodity, a group of commodities or tracking a commodity index.  
Excluded commodities. This term refers to the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 
2000. Excluded commodities are commodities such as financial products, services and 
intangible assets whose derivative contracts are excluded from most supervision.  
Exempt commodities. Exempt commodities are energy and metals commodities whose 
derivative contracts are exempted from some supervisory provisions. Popularly referred to as 
the ‘Enron Loophole’ for the lobbying role Enron played when the rule was approved.   
FFA (Forward Freight Agreement). FFA are OTC derivative contracts on freight rates 
tailored to specific routes. The commercial entity buys FFA from a counterparty to ensure it will 
pay certain freight rates in the future on that specific route. 22 | PIERO CINQUEGRANA 
 
FOB (Free on Board). FOB is a type of commercial contract whereby the responsibility of 
execution lies with the buyer. All the costs related to transportation and insurance of the 
commodity fall onto the buyer. 
Forward market. The forward market is similar to the cash market, but the delivery and 
payment are deferred for reasons of commercial convenience or necessity.  
Market manipulation. Commodity markets may be subject to manipulation through ‘corner 
and squeeze’ (see above) or ‘banging the close’, which refers to the practice of acquiring a 
substantial position leading up to the closing period, followed by offsetting the position before 
the close of trading for the purpose of attempting to manipulate prices. There have been some 
high-profile cases of market manipulation: 1979-80 in the silver market (Hunt brothers); early 
90s in the copper market (Sumimoto); 2004 in the propane market (BP); 2006 in the natural gas 
market (Amaranth).   
OTC (over-the-counter). OTC refers both to derivative and spot transactions. OTC contracts 
are characterised by the absence of an intermediary between two counterparties. Sometimes 
OTC contracts are cleared through an exchange or a clearing-house to mitigate counterparty 
risk.  
Price Discovery. Price discovery is one of the two social functions attached to futures markets, 
the other being hedging. Futures markets are believed to ‘discover’ the price of a commodity 
thanks to the multiple interactions of speculators and hedgers in secondary markets. Futures 
prices signal real and expected market conditions for commodities determined by supply, 
demand and inventories.  
Roll yield. In commodity indexes, the roll yield is calculated as the return made when rolling 
over futures contracts, i.e. selling future contracts about to expire to buy longer-dated contracts 
in order to avoid delivery. In a backwardated market, the roll yield is positive, whereas in a 
contango market, the roll yield is negative. This means that following commodity indices is a 
profitable strategy only when the market is in backwardation, a situation in which spot prices 
are rising.  
Speculative limits. The amended Commodity Exchange Act of 1934 gives the CFTC the 
authority to set speculative limits to prevent excessive speculation from driving spot prices 
away from fundamentals.  
Spot market. See cash market.  
Spot price. Price for immediate or near immediate delivery (generally one month or less). 
Spot return. In commodity indexes, the spot return is calculated as the daily appreciation of the 
underlying futures contracts used to price the index.   
WTI (West Texas Intermediate). The WTI is a quality of crude oil extracted in North 
America. It is widely used as a benchmark to price other type of crudes, which are sold/bought 
at a differential. The WTI future contract traded on the NYMEX is the most liquid of all 
commodity derivatives contracts.  | 23 
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